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INTRODUCTION

The fact that our law permits, and our lawyers pursue,
impeachment of witnesses with their prior convictions has
provoked widespread and intense criticism. This practice
exists in the federal system and all but one of the states, 1 and
involves the use of qualifying convictions for the ostensible
purpose of attacking witnesses' "character for truthfulness."2
Its many critics raise several concerns, challenging not only
the assumption that convictions shed meaningful light on
truthfulness but also the effects of this practice, including the
compounding of racial bias, the deterrence of testimony, and
the inevitable misuse by jurors of these convictions. On that
final point, empirical evidence supports the concern that
jurors use this evidence to make forbidden inferences about
© Anna Roberts, 2022. The author has not granted rights to reprint this article under a
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial license. Please contact the author
directly for reprint permission.
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1 FED. R. EVID. 609; Anna Roberts, Conviction by PriorImpeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1977, 2027 (2016) (explaining that Montana is the only state to ban impeachment of all
witnesses by conviction).
2 FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
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witnesses' perceived propensity to commit crimes, or their

general badness.3
These critiques have been leveled with most intensity at
the ability (and tendency) of prosecutors to engage in this form
of attack on testifying defendants.4 After all, it is only
defendant-witnesses for whom this practice can constitute an
expressway to prison. As a result, while some scholars have
called for abolition of this practice across the board (as has been
done in Montana5), several others recommend abolishing it
only as regards defendant-witnesses (as Hawai'i6 and Kansas?
have done).
This article makes the case for careful attention to a
neglected phenomenon within this topic:8 the opportunity given
to, and taken by, defense attorneys to impeach prosecution
witnesses. Grappling with what to permit with this kind of
witness is a necessary component of the reform initiatives
currently gaining momentum, 9 and grappling with the defense
role vis-A-vis this practice helps illuminate the complexities of
reformist or even abolitionist roles for defenders.
As is perhaps to be expected with the most controversial
of the rules of evidence,10 reform possibilities are fraught. On the
one hand, the Montana model of across-the-board abolition
raises concerns, constitutional and otherwise, about removing a
tool (however problematic) from the defense. On the other hand,
its continuing availability for the defense brings the same kinds
of concerns as its availability for the prosecution-albeit in less
intense form. Similarly, if one thinks about the defense role in
contemplating the use of this potentially potent tool, refusing to
deploy it seems incompatible with the duty of zealous advocacy.
But an increasing number of individual and institutional
3 See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the CriminalDefendant with a PriorRecordLessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 477, 488-92 (2008).
4 See Daniel R. Tilly, Victims Under Attack: North Carolina'sFlawed Rule
609, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1553, 1555-57 (2019).
5 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (West, Westlaw through the 2021 Sess.).
6 HAw. REV. STAT. § 626-1-609(a) (West, Westlaw through Act 19 of the 2022
Reg. Sess.).
7 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (West, Westlaw through the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
8 For two recent articles highlighting aspects of this practice, see Tilly, supra
note 4; and Anibal Rosario-Lebr6n, Evidence's #Me Too Moment, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 1 (2019).
9 See Ass'n of Am. L. Schs., Call for Participation in a Discussion Group on
CriticalEvidence Reform: How Do We ChangePriorConviction Impeachment in the U.S?,
AALS 2022 ANN. MEETING [hereinafter AALS Call for Participation: CriticalEvidence
Reform], https://am.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/07/Critical-Evidence-Refor
m-CFP.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3M3-VMPH].
10 See Montre D. Carodine, "The Mis-Characterizationof the Negro": A Race
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (2009)
(discussing the federal version).
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defenders champion a role that goes beyond individual zealous
advocacy and pursues broader reform, or indeed abolitionist
visions." The use of a tool that reifies the conviction as a
meaningful character brand and that-like others in the defense
arsenal-pounds stereotypes into our law and broader life
suggests limits to these visions.
The complexity of these issues does not lend itself to easy
resolution. Indeed, the conflict is in part the point. Prior conviction
impeachment reminds us that the criminal system is called upon
to do potentially incompatible things: to protect the rights of those
charged with crimes but also to accord respect and dignity to
complainants. It reminds us that defense attorneys are
increasingly compelled to do incompatible things: to use tools that
rely on regressive stereotypes but also to fight regressive
stereotypes. This topic thus illuminates, and is illuminated by,
abolitionist efforts to push away from a system that risks
reinforcing the shared subordination of complainant and
defendant, and toward efforts to offer respect and dignity to all.
Part I describes the contours of prior conviction
impeachment and the critiques that it has inspired, particularly
when the impeachment of those charged with crimes is being
considered. Part II demonstrates the need for increased attention
to prosecution witnesses (whether complainants,

cooperating

witnesses, or others), explaining the relevance of this focus to
three contemporary inquiries.

The first of these inquiries, addressed in Section II.A, is
how and whether to regulate the prior conviction impeachment of
prosecution witnesses, given the conflicting values at stake. A
provocative decision by the late Judge Jack Weinstein crystallizes
the issue. The second inquiry, addressed in Section II.B, uses this
phenomenon to illuminate tensions within the defense role.
Section II.C builds on the suggestions that there are intractable
tensions within the regulation of prior conviction impeachment,
and that there are intractable tensions within the defense role,
to suggest that one might approach these tensions not (just)
" See, e.g., Racial Equity Action Plan-Phase 1, S.F. PUB. DEF'S. OFF.
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/02/PDRRacial-Equity-Action-Plan-Phase-I-updated-2-5-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WDV-CLV
B] (quoting San Francisco Public Defender Manohar Raju as saying that "[p]ublic
defenders have always played an active and important role in combatting racial
and social injustice in the criminal legal system, both inside and outside the courtroom.
Fighting for racial justice is a core part of our work, and together with my committed
team, I spend every day examining the criminal legal system and our role as advocates
through this lens."); Nicole Smith Futrell, The Practice and Pedagogy of Carceral
Abolition in a Criminal Defense Clinic, 45 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 159, 164 (2021)
(mentioning that many new public defenders are "pronouncing themselves to
be abolitionists").
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with the goal of resolving them as effectively as possible, but
with the goal of understanding their breadth and depth and the
resulting appeal of abolitionist thinking. The system and those
who work within it are being asked to serve conflicting goals,
and a system that strives toward values that run headlong into
each other may be a system that needs to be rethought.
I.

PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT: LEGAL AND
SCHOLARLY LANDSCAPE

This Part will introduce the relevant aspects of prior
conviction impeachment. It will also introduce the main
strands of critique that it has inspired.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (FRE 609) lays out the
federal framework for prior conviction impeachment. While
there is a great deal of state variation, the federal rule has
proved influential in a number of states.12 It denotes this
practice as one that permits attacks on a'witness's "character
for truthfulness," and establishes two main types of conviction
that may be admissible for this purpose.13 The first category
involves convictions that are punishable by death or more than
a year in prison (these will be referred to as "qualifying felony
convictions"); the second category involves convictions that
required proof or admission of a "dishonest act or false
statement"14 (these will be referred to as crimina falsi). The
qualifying felony convictions are admissible only if the
applicable test weighing probative value and prejudice is met, 5
and according to the language of the rule, the balancing test is
more hostile to the evidence if the witness in question is
charged with a crime.'s The crimina falsi are mandatorily
admissible once offered: unusually within the Federal Rules of
Evidence, judges have no opportunity to exclude them because
of the risk of unfair prejudice.1
12
See Anna Roberts, Conviction by PriorImpeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977,
1987 (2016) ("Forty-seven states, along with the District. of Columbia, follow the
federal government in permitting impeachment of criminal defendants with their
criminal records, but of those only seventeen states follow FRE 609 either exactly or
very closely.").
13 FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
14 Id. at 609(a)(2).
15
Id. at 609(a)(1). Note that under FRE 609(a)(1)(A), the FRE 403 risks other
than unfair prejudice may also be weighed.
16 Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A) (stating that a conviction of this sort
"must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the
witness is not a defendant"), with 609(a)(1)(B) (stating that a conviction of this sort "must
be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value
of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant").
17 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
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This configuration was the product of compromise
rather than a unified vision,18 and there is a corresponding
lack of clarity in the justifications offered for it. With respect
to the qualifying felony convictions, courts often assert
that such a conviction reveals willful violation of laws
and norms and that this indicates an increased likelihood
of willful violation of the prohibition on perjury.19 This sounds
less like a rationale based on "character for truthfulness,"
as FRE 609's language would seem to require, and more like
a rationale based on asserted character for willful rules
violation.20 The crimina falsi justification is easier
to understand and involves the notion that a prior conviction
for a "crime of dishonesty" reveals a character that makes it
more likely than otherwise that one will be dishonest on the
witness stand.21
The remainder of FRE 609 gives additional details about
the circumstances under which this kind of evidence can, and
cannot, be admitted.22 For example, FRE 609(b) indicates that
after ten years it becomes harder-but not impossible-to
admit these convictions.23
There is considerable state variation on all of the
issues mentioned above: which (if any) convictions are
admissible; whether their admission is discretionary or
mandatory; what period of time (if any) is flagged by the
relevant rule as salient; and whether that period of time brings
about an absolute cut-off.24 The three states whose approaches
differ most dramatically from the federal rules are Hawai'i and
Kansas, each of which bars this kind of impeachment as
regards criminal defendants-provided that they are not found
to have "opened the door" by introducing evidence to support
their credibility25-and Montana, which (alone among the
1e See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1982-83 ("The FRE 609 rules on impeachment
of criminal defendants represented a political compromise: the House of Representatives
wanted only convictions involving dishonesty or false statements to be admissible, while
the Senate wanted felony convictions to be admissible as well.").
19 See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV.
563, 563 (2014).
20 Id. at 587 ("[D]efendants with convictions are said to have 'sinned,' to have
'transgressed society's norms,' or to have shown a 'willingness to ignore the law."').
21 See id. at 564.
22 FED. R. EVID. 609(b)-(e).
23 See id. at 609(b) (stating that evidence of the prior conviction is admissible
after ten years only if: "(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives
an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a
fair opportunity to contest its use").
24 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1980-81.
21
Id. at 1981 nn.21- 2 2, 2022.
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states) has barred this form of impeachment as regards
witnesses of all sorts. 26
Generally speaking, scholarly analyses of prior
conviction impeachment have concentrated on the federal
scheme,27 have been critical, and have focused their criticism on
the use or threat of this practice against criminal defendants. I
shall review their main themes relatively briefly in what follows.
A.

Tenuous Connection to Veracity

First is the argument that some or all of the convictions
routinely admitted do not shed meaningful light on the likelihood
of truthful testimony.28 Investigation of the assumptions
underlying this practice has led some to conclude that it rests on
"junk science' at its worst."29 Scholars have pointed out that the
concept that this evidence is said to illuminate-one's "character
for truthfulness"30-rests on assumptions that are complicated by
contemporary psychological research.31 They point to the
sidelining of the "trait theory" that underlies the rule.32 They
emphasize the influence of contextual factors on truthfulness, and
the failure of the rule to take such factors into account.33
26 Id. at 2027; MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (West, Westlaw through the 2021
Sess.) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime is not admissible.").
27
See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1987-90.
28 This was the reason named as most important by the Montana Commission
responsible for drafting Montana's provision on this matter: the commission did "not accept as
valid the [FRE drafters'] theory that a person's willingness to break the law can automatically
be translated into willingness to give false testimony." MONT. R. EVID. 609 commission's cmt.
29 See Dannye W. Holley, Federalism Gone Far Astray from Policy and
Constitutional Concerns:The Admission of Convictions to Impeach by State's Rules-19902004, 2:2 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 239, 304-05 (2005) (arguing that the assumption "that
disobedience to law is logical evidence of a greater propensity to lie-is 'junk science' at its
worst"); id. at 295 ("[S]tate supreme courts ... interpret [their] diverse standards based on
judicially crafted junk science heuristics, with an apparent eye to sanctioning admission of
a vast array of convictions against persons accused of crimes.").
30
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
31 See, e.g., Robert D. Okun, Characterand Credibility:A Proposalto Realign
FederalRules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 547 (1992) ("[P]sychological
research . . . has generally discredited this 'trait theory' of personality, and has replaced
it with theories that view behavior as a 'learned response to specific contextual factors'
(situationism) or as the interaction between specific character traits and specific
contextual factors (interactionism). In fact, numerous studies have cast substantial
doubt on the proposition that personality is determined by 'traits' that produce consistent
behavior in different situations.").
32 Id.; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Honesty Without Truth: Lies, Accuracy, and
the Criminal Justice Process, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 22, 29-30 (2018) ("Social
psychology long ago moved beyond the trait theory on which the rule's rationale depends
and recognized the influence of situational pressures.").
33 See Okun, supra note 31, at 547; see also Griffin, supra note 32, at 29-30;
Richard Friedman, CharacterImpeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?]Analysis and a
Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 646-47 (1991); Jonathan D. Kurland, Character

2022]

B.

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CROSS PURPOSES

1231

Tenuous Connection to Guilt

A fundamental assumption at the root of this use of
convictions-namely that a conviction reliably conveys
commission of a particular type of crime34-is a questionable one
in our criminal system.3 5 The drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence gave weight to distinctions between prison-eligible
convictions and others,36 and between convictions requiring
particular factual findings or admissions and others.37 The
meaning attributed to these distinctions is undermined by the
rough-and-ready way in which criminal convictions are handed
out in many of this nation's courts. 38 Whether one winds up with
a felony conviction, a misdemeanor conviction, or no conviction
at all, or whether one winds up with a conviction for crime X
rather than crime Y, is often not the product of precise
calibration.39 It is the product, among other things, of fear, of
trading, of compromise.40 And even putting aside these dividing
lines, one needs to think more generally about the existence of a
conviction and whether it speaks in a reliable way to guilt, and
thus whether one can merge, as this practice does, crime
conviction with crime commission. In the views of the scholars
advancing this critique, one cannot.4 ' Ours is a system marked,
for example, by inadequate provision of defense counsel and
overwhelming pressure to plead guilty, and by racism that
permits both those things.42 This helps to create a situation
where convictions may have more to say about subordination
and disadvantage than about guilt.

as a Process in Judgment and Decision-Making and Its Implications for the Character
Evidence Prohibition in Anglo-American Law, 38 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 135, 148 (2014)
(describing consensus among psychological researchers that behavior is a function of
"mutual interaction between situation and an individual's 'psychic structure"').
39 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee's note ("As a means of
impeachment, evidence of conviction of crime is significant only because it stands as
proof of the commission of the underlying criminal act.").
38 See Roberts, supra note 19, at 587; see also John D. King, The Meaning of a
Misdemeanor in a Post-Ferguson World: Evaluating the Reliability of Prior Conviction
Evidence, 54 GA. L. REV. 927, 933-47 (2020); Blume, supra note 3, at 477.
38 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
37 Id. at 609(a)(2).
88
See Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504 (2020).
39 See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
40 See Roberts, supra note 38, at 2510-27.
4 See King, supra note 35, at 927; see also Blume, supranote 3, at 477; Roberts,
supra note 19, at 563.
42 See Roberts, supra note 38, at 2512-14, 2529.
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Risk of Unfair Prejudice

Next, there is the concern about unfair prejudice. Many
scholars think it unrealistic to instruct the jury to use these
convictions only for the permitted purpose of assessing a witness's
"character for truthfulness."43 Indeed, some have attempted to
bolster this intuition with empirical research, adding force to the
argument that jurors use this evidence in forbidden ways.4 4 Their
arguments are strengthened by an examination of the kinds of
convictions that are routinely admitted. Under the crimina falsi
umbrella, however prejudicial convictions may be, they
are mandatorily admissible if the prosecutor proffers them.46
Under the qualifying felony conviction provision, judges frequently
admit convictions when potential prejudice is obvious,
whether the prejudice stems from their similarity to the charge
against the defendant,46 from their numerosity,47 or from their
stigmatizing nature.48
4 See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281,
323-24 (2013) (mentioning data that indicates that limiting jury instructions are
ineffective in the context of "highly salient or emotionally charged" content); Roberts, supra
note 1, at 2015 (Jury instructions justified as a means to keep jurors on track in this regard
"have been called 'little more than a judicial placebo,' a 'judicial lie,' a 'hollow[] . . . pretense,'
'illogical,' and 'mere legal sophistry." (footnotes omitted)).
4
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the
Stand: The Effect of a Prior CriminalRecord on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes,
94 CoRNELL L. REV. 1353, 1388 (2009) ("If, as our results and experimental results suggest, prior
record affects case outcomes but not credibility, the historical justification for allowing the use of
criminal records is unfounded."); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions:When Jurors Use PriorConviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985) (finding that defendants' criminal records increased likelihood of
conviction but not because they affected assessments of their credibility); Jeffrey Bellin,
Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal
Defendants with PriorConvictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 300 (2008) ("[E]mpirical studies
and common sense suggest that a limiting instruction offers little protection against the
prejudice inherent in prior conviction impeachment."); Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 32-33 nn.150-52 (1988)
(discussing "[s]ocial psychology data reflect[ing] the conclusion that prior convictions have
virtually no probative value as a predictor for determining a witness' in-court veracity"); Griffin,
supra note 43, at 323-24 ('The available social science indicates that limiting instructions fall
short when it comes to any highly salient or emotionally charged content, and that improving
them will require broader correction of their flawed premise."); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects
on Juries ofHearingAbout the Defendant'sPrevious CriminalRecord:A Simulation Study, 2000
CRM. L. REV. 734, 738 (2000) ("What is clear is that it cannot be assumed that jurors will follow
an instruction on the use of evidence ofprevious convictions.").
4
For example, a conviction could be for precisely the same offense as the one charged.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 08 CR 466, 2011 WL 809194, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2011)
(denying a motion to bar the introduction of wire fraud conviction in wire fraud trial).
46 See Bellin, supra note 44, at 331-32.
4 See Dannye R. Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to
Impeach: State Supreme Courts'InterpretiveStandards, 1990-2004,2007 MICH. ST. L. REV.
307, 342, 379 (2007).
48 See, e.g., Julia T. Rickert, DenyingDefendants the Benefit of a ReasonableDoubt.
FederalRule of Evidence 609 and PastSex CrimeConvictions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY
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This is a critique that applies with most force in the context
of impeachment of criminal defendants, because there are a variety
of forbidden uses of the evidence that can lead straight to the prison
cell:49 use of the conviction to conclude that, because of it, the person
is more likely to have committed the charged crime,0 or is worthless,
or ought to be locked up, and so on. Indeed, much of the empirical
data was gathered from mock jurors who were instructed to use the
records of criminal defendants to assess their credibility as
witnesses, but who apparently used them for other purposes.61
D.

Racial Bias

Scholars have explored a variety of ways in which this
practice deepens the racial inequities of our criminal system and
the broader social structures of which it is a part. Arrests are made
unequally;2 convictions are imposed unequally;63 sentences are

crafted unequally.54 Prior conviction impeachment compounds all
of this. While prior conviction impeachment frames the conviction
as being about the witness, and about-in the words of one courther portrayal as something other than a "normal citizen,"65 the
imposition of law enforcement contact and criminal records is' a
governmental act, and one that may be routine in low-income
communities of color.56
Scholars point out that this practice is the child of, and
an obedient child of, earlier laws that kept witnesses off the
stand completely, including laws that prohibited Black
the
highlight
Scholars
testifying.67
from
witnesses
disproportionate likelihood that Black witnesses will have
convictions with which they can be impeached.58 They identify

213, 241 (2010) ("[T]he strength of jurors' 'personal revulsion for sex offenses' is frequently
ignored when the witness is the defendant.").
49 Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 44, at 1389 ("The enhanced conviction
probability that prior record evidence supplies in close cases may well contribute to
erroneous convictions.").
50 See Blume, supra note 3, at 493 ("[T]hreatening a defendant with the
introduction of his . . . prior record contributes to wrongful convictions either directlyin cases where the defendant is impeached with the prior record and the jury draws the
propensity inference-or indirectly-by keeping the defendant off the stand.").
61 See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 44, at 1358-61 (summarizing studies).
62 Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 1026 (2019).
63 Roberts, supra note 38, at 2546.
64 Roberts, supra note 19, at 596 (noting that sentence length is a detail that
impeaching attorneys are often permitted to bring out).
65 Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1977).
66
See, e.g., King, supranote 35, at 930.
67 See Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibilityby Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 165 (2017).
58 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010) ("[I]n major cities wracked by the drug war, as
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multiple layers of racial bias wrapped up inside, then redoubled
by, convictions. This concern is particularly intense in regard to
criminal defendants, but it is not restricted to them. Think, for
example, of a complainant in a prosecution alleging excessive
police force-or excessive force of any sort. 59 If the complainant
has a conviction, it may be used to destroy their testimony.60
Given the fact that convictions fall with disparate racial impact,
the use of this practice throws racially biased obstacles in the
path of those who seek to have their claims of harm believed.
This same phenomenon affects the state's allocation of "victim
compensation," which in several states is denied to those with
criminal records,61 thus again tying worth to conviction status
and often to race.
E.

Deterrence

The threat of this form of impeachment has also incurred
criticism because of its potential to deter testimony, and often
trial.62 There is empirical support, for example, for the power of this
form of impeachment to chill defendants' testimony.63 One study
examined a group of people facing serious charges of which they
were later exonerated; they frequently waived their right to testify,
and their attorneys gave as the primary reason their fear of prior
conviction impeachment.64 They were convicted, and indeed there
is empirical support for the notion that jurors-despite
constitutional protections and instructions that prohibit this-do
indeed want to hear both sides of the story,65 and penalize,66 or are

many as 80 percent of young African American men now have criminal records and are
thus subject to legalized discrimination for the rest of their lives.").
9
See Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network, and the
Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 465-67 (2011) (discussing claims of excessive force used
in low-income and minority communities); see also Tamara F. Lawson, Powerless Against
Police Brutality: A Felon's Story, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 218, 219-20, 238-43 (2013)
(discussing civil claims).
0 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 59, at 219-20.
61 Alysia Santo, Seven States Ban Victim Aid to People with Criminal Records,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.themarshall
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 13,
project.org/2018/09/13/the-victims-who-don-t-count [https://perma.cc/49AH-VMGJ]; see
also Anna Roberts, Victims, Right?, 42 CARDOZo L. REV. 1449, 1479-80 (2021).
62 Griffin, supra note 32, at 23, 28-29.
63 Bellin, supra note 44, at 301 n.40 (explaining that the fear of impeachment is
the most powerful incentive not to testify); see also id. at 335 n.168; Blume, supra note 3,
at 490-91.
64 Blume, supra note 3, at 477.
65 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 518 n.102 (1986); see also James
E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposalto Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction
Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 609 (1985).
66 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 399 (2018).
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suspicious of,67 those who do not provide the same.68 Indeed, some
scholars argue that we should all want to hear defendants'
testimony, given its potential to aid jurors in moving beyond
stereotypes to individuating information,69 and given its potential
more generally to enhance fact-finding,70 societal understanding,71
and the scrutiny of governmental conduct and evidence.72
F.

LastingImpact

Finally, this form of impeachment contributes to
assumptions of permanency-and the concrete array of permanent
reminders-relating to criminal convictions. In this context, a
conviction is not something that the state does to you, but something
that you are, and can never-or hardly ever-shake.73 The federal
system may make it harder to introduce these convictions after ten
years, but it is not impossible, and this provision is not shared among
all states. 74 In addition, ten years is a significant period of time.

67 Lauren Cusitello, Serial's Big Confession, MEDIUM: FOR THE LOVE OF PODCAST
(Nov 15, 2014), https//medium.com/for-the-love-of-podcast/serials-big-confession-10611ff75c13
[https-//perma.ec/99AH-DKDC] (reporting a juror's answer to the question whether it bothered
the jury that the defendant did not take the stand: "Yes, it did. That was huge. Yeah, that was
huge.... Why not, if you're a defendant, why would you not get up there and defend yourself
and try to prove that the State is wrong, that you weren't there, that you're not guilty?").
63 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 13 (1993) ("Jurors believe that an innocent person proclaims it from the rooftops."); see
also Bellin, supranote 44, at 335; George Fisher, PleaBargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857,
977-78 (2000) ('"[T]he jurors all know, ... that the defendant has the privilege (as it is called) of
making himself a witness if he sees fit; and they also know that he would if he dared.' Therefore,
his silence 'will, and inevitably must, create a presumption against him, even if every page of
the statute-book contained a provision that it should not. The statutes might as well prohibit the
tide from rising... .' (quoting Judge Seth Ames)).
69 See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant's Testimony:
PriorConviction Impeachment and the FightAgainst Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CH. L. REV.
835, 835 (2016); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, AntidiscriminationLaw and the Perils
of Mindreading, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, 1114 (2006) ("[S]tereotype effects recede as people
learn more about each other as individuals, with individuating information often
overwhelming stereotype information.").
70 Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008) (claiming
that defendant testimony increases the reliability of criminal trial outcomes).
71 See id. at 858; Montr6 D. Carodine, "Street Cred," 46 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
1583, 1590 (2013); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2005) (critiquing the silencing of the criminal
defendant through impeachment, as at many other stages of the criminal process); id. at
1499 ("If the system was intended to keep society substantially clueless about the people
it incarcerates, it could not have been better designed.").
72 See Natapoff, supra note 71, at 1499 (noting that if defendants could speak
freely, "[t]he system would ... obtain more information about law enforcement and how
police behave").
73 Roberts, supranote 1, at 2008.
74 Id. at 1985.
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These critiques have led some to suggest abolition of this
practice across the board,75 and others to suggest it as regards
criminal defendants only.76 The implications for prosecution
witnesses are less well-explored. Because of important
contemporary questions about reform, abolition, and the role of
the defense attorney in both, it is time to give more prominence
to the question of what to do about witnesses for the government.

II.

THREE SALIENT QUESTIONS

This Part will highlight three inquiries-starting
relatively narrow but getting progressively broader-that are
illuminated by a focus on the impeachment of prosecution
witnesses. Each of these questions is hard to resolve, but
the aim here is to highlight their importance, suggest potential
lines of investigation, and indeed draw attention to the difficulty
of resolution.
A.

What Should Reform Look Like?

The first question is how to reform prior conviction
impeachment. The overwhelming weight of the scholarly
conversation tends toward the need for change. Scholars have made
reform proposals to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee,77 and
have recently banded together with the goal of investigating change
at the state and federal level.78 But if there is to be a renewed push
for change, where should that push be aimed? Abolition of the
practice solely as it pertains to criminal defendants, for example, or
across the board? One cannot make that choice without examining
the impeachment of prosecution witnesses.
Whereas the weight of the scholarly conversation might
suggest that the concerns are severe only as regards criminal
75 See, e.g., Brian J. Foley, Until We Fix the Labs and Fund Criminal
Defendants: FightingBad Science with Storytelling, 43 TULSA L. REV. 397, 413 (2007).
76 See, e.g., Carodine, supra note 10, at 682.

77 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, SPRING 2018 MEETING AGENDA

BOOK 6 (Apr. 26-27, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/agenda book
[https://perma.cc/Z2F2-U9UQ]
advisorycommittee_onrulesof evidence--_final.pdf
(describing a proposal from Magistrate Judge Tim Rice to "bar impeachment with prior
convictions that do not involve dishonesty or false statement"); ADVISORY COMM. ON
RULES OF EVIDENCE, FALL 2018 MEETING AGENDA BOOK 440, 442 (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQX4-F433] (mentioning a proposal by Ric Simmons and a suggestion
by Jeff Bellin).
78 See AALS Call for Participation: CriticalEvidence Reform, supra note 9.
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defendants, a closer examination complicates that view. A recent
opinion by the late Judge Weinstein provides a useful focal
point.79 In a federal prosecution alleging the armed robbery of a
Brooklyn bodega, the government moved for the exclusion of the
criminal convictions of a government witness. That witness, Bazel
Almontaser, was a bodega clerk alleged to have seen the incident,
and indeed to have escaped a bullet's path.o Mr. Almontaser had
"two prior convictions for domestic violence-one for felony
attempted assault and one for misdemeanor attempted assault."81
But the jury never heard about them. Judge Weinstein granted the
motion to prohibit their use, and in explaining his reasoning, he
worked his way through each of the types of scholarly argument
mentioned above-tenuous connection to veracity, tenuous
connection to guilt, risk of unfair prejudice, racial bias, deterrence,
and lasting impact. And he ended with a citation to scholarship that
had raised all these issues in connection with the impeachment of
those charged with crimes, and had made not a mention of other
witnesses. The relevant portion of his opinion follows:
It is dubious whether the convictions are relevant, since assault does not
shed light on veracity. The defense argues that the fact that the witness
denied committing one or both assaults to the police, and later entered
guilty pleas for both, shows that his words cannot be trusted. Defense
counsel is undoubtedly aware, however, that in light of the significant
risks and emotional toll of going to trial, many defendants plead guilty to
crimes they did not commit.
Nonetheless, even assuming defendant's [sic] 8 2 guilty pleas are
relevant, their introduction at trial cannot be permitted under Rule 403.83
Domestic violence is a disturbing issue that would undoubtedly prejudice
the jury's view of Almontaser and his testimony at trial. Were the court to
allow cross-examination of the witness on these convictions, it would fail to
afford protection to a large population of minorities in New York State who
have had contact with the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff,
2016 WL 3369419, at *15 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is no
secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of [law enforcement]
scrutiny." (citing M. ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CRoW 95-136 (2010))).
Members of these communities should not be discouraged from coming
forward to testify about serious threats to public safety in the areas where
7 United States v. Walker, 315 F.R.D. 154, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), as amended
(Aug. 2, 2016), opinion amended and superseded, 15-CR-388, 2016 WL 4091250 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 2, 2016).
80 United States v. Walker, 314 F. Supp. 3d 400, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ("During the
robbery of a bodega in Brooklyn, New York, Shameke Walker ('Walker) fired at a store clerk
with a revolver. The bullet missed the clerk, but pierced the leg of an uninvolved security guard
standing across the street."); see also Walker, 315 F.R.D. at 155.
81 United States v. Walker, 974 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2020).
82 It. is interesting to note the typo and hypothesize about how it came about
and went unnoticed.
83 See FED. R. Evi. 403 (permitting a judge to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of, for example, unfair prejudice).
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they live and work. Whether Almontaser's convictions were justified is not
for this court to decide. What it can decide, however, is to limit the constant
reminder of these past acts. The witness is already burdened by the
collateral consequences of a felony conviction and need not be subjected to
further scrutiny. Cf. Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the
Defendant's Testimony: PriorConviction Impeachment and the Fight against
Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (2016).84

Judge Weinstein was not opining on the desirability of
prohibiting such impeachment across the board (though some of his
points seem to have rather broad applicability), but his opinion is an
interesting reminder that while one does not have to worry about
this form of impeachment prompting the jurors to convict a
prosecution witness, prior conviction impeachment raises many

concerns that are not limited to attacks on defendant-witnesses.
One might therefore be tempted to consider the option of
abolishing this practice across the board. If it does indeed
compound racial bias, rest on and endorse stereotyped thinking,85
and rely on junk science, why keep it around? This path has been
taken by Montana, which abolished the practice for all witnesses
in 1976.86 And as regards an analogous tool-the peremptory

challenge, known to be used for prohibited purposes and in a way
that endorses stereotypes and compounds racial bias87-many
scholars have called for its abolition across the board to free the
legal system of this scourge. 88
But one of course needs to recall the fact that the sides in a
criminal prosecution are not in symmetrical positions.89 Pushes for
abolition of the peremptory challenge have been countered by
suggestions that it be abolished-or reduced in number-for the

84 Walker, 315 F.R.D. at 156 (citations omitted).
86 See Griffin, supra note 32, at 31 (noting that the rule "codifies a stereotype
about felons").
86 Note that it is possible for defendants to open the door to admissions of
convictions if they are found to have made false statements about them. See State v.
Bingman, 61 P.3d 153, 160 (Mont. 2002). For an examination of the implementation of
the Montana rules, see Roberts, supra note 1, at 2027-23.
87 See Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness,92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1503, 1524 (2015).
88 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995) (arguing peremptory challenges should be eliminated
because they allow attorneys "to manipulate demographics and chisel an unrepresentative
panel out of a cross-sectional venire"); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Courtand the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 153,
199-211 (1989) ("Few peremptory challenges could survive even rational basis scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause."). Note that Arizona just took this step. See Ian Millhiser,
Arizona Launches a Bold New Experiment to Limit Racist Convictions, VoX
(Aug. 31, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/22648651/arizona-jury-race-batson-kentuckyperemptory-strikes-challenges-thurgood-marshall [https://perma.cc/RL6V-CNLR].
89 See Roberts, supra note 87, at 1506; People v. Hayes, 301 N.W.2d 828, 830
(Mich. 1981) ("[C]onsiderations relating to the propriety of impeaching defendants and
other witnesses ... are not identical.").
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prosecution only;90 that the defense has a greater need for it
(including a debiasing need91); and that this is a rare opportunity for
the defense to screen out biased criminal system decigion-makers.92
Similarly, Hawai'i and Kansas have concluded that prior conviction
impeachment should be abolished as regards criminal defendantwitnesses only,93 and that it should remain available as a tool for
criminal defense counsel.94 Even given all the concerns about prior
conviction impeachment highlighted by Judge Weinstein, one
should hesitate before proposing a ban that impacts criminal
defendants, both for constitutional reasons and for reasons that do
not necessarily have constitutional bases.
The right to confront is the most obvious constitutional
basis for objection to a ban on impeachment of prosecution
witnesses. Montana's ban on impeachment across the board has
survived, despite constitutional objections to the regime,95 and
"[s]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal
trials,"96 but the possibility of successful defense challenges to
abolition remains. In Davis v. Alaska, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that the right to confront includes the right to crossexamine and overturned the denial of defense impeachment using
a prosecution witness's juvenile record.97 Some courts have drawn
authority from Davis and other cases to find for the defense on
the issue of whether a denial of prior conviction impeachment
constituted a violation of the right to confront.98
9
See, e.g., Hayes, 301 N.W.2d at 830; Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish
Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163, 1164 (2014);
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposalto EliminateRacially DiscriminatoryUses
of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1148 (1994).
91 See Roberts, supra note 87, at 1524-32.
92 See id. at 1527-28.
9 Note that in both states the defense can be found to have opened the door to this
form of impeachment by introducing evidence supporting their credibility. See Roberts, supra
note 1, at 1981 nn.21-22.
94 And, one could argue, again for a potential debiasing purpose.
95 See State v. Doyle, 160 P.3d 516, 526-27 (Mont. 2007) (resolving state and
federal confrontation right objection to Montana regime by finding that the right to
confront was not violated by the court's limitation of cross-examination based on
Montana's Rule 609); see also State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259 (Mont. 1993).
9 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United States
v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)); id. (noting that the right to present a complete
defense is abridged by evidence rules that '"infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the
accused' and are 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve"' (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308)).
97 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-17, 320 (1974).
98 See, e.g., People v. Redmon, 315 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
that a state restriction on prior conviction impeachment "must yield to the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation so fundamental to our system of criminal justice"); Vasquez v. Jones, 496
F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he state courts' failure to recognize that the exclusion of
Vasquez's past-crimes impeachment evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights
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Even if there were no constitutional bar to broader adoption
of the Montana model, there are a variety of other reasons why one
should hesitate to say that the defense should be deprived of this
potential tool (flawed as it is). It is not unusual for scholars to observe
that the deck is stacked against the defense,99 and from this
stance it is problematic to think about removing one of the
defense's tools. In addition, this tool may respond rather
directly to one of the most concerning forms of deck-stacking.
That form of stacking is the frequent construction in advance
of and during trial of two diametrically opposed sides: the
innocent "victim(s)" and the guilty/criminal "offender."10 Law
enforcement attempts to tell a story of guilt at trial-indeed,
well before trial.101 It is a story that may be rehearsed,102 that
may be bought

(in both senses),103

that may be false,104

that may be coordinated,105 and that is often supported by the
media,106 vocabulary,107 handcuffs,10s and other mechanisms. It is a
represents an unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence, most notably Davis v.
Alaska."); State v. Conroy, 642 P.2d 873, 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
* See, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, The CriminalDefense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and
Prejudice, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19-20 (1994) ("[T]here is a nearly universal
view that the adversary system places one accused of a crime in such a weak
position vis-a-vis the state that he deserves every protection possible against
governmental overreaching.").
100 See Roberts, supra note 52, at 1009-10 (critiquing the prevalence in criminal
legal contexts of preadjudication uses of "offender'); State v. Corbin, 892 P.2d 580, 583 (Nev.
1995) ('The criminal defendant's character is already tainted by the mere fact of being the
accused."); Vida B. Johnson, Silenced by Instruction, 70 EMORY L.J. 309, 311 (2020)
(describing jury instructions to view a criminal defendant's testimony with caution). See
generally Roberts, supra note 61 (critiquing the prevalence in criminal legal contexts of
preadjudication uses of "victim").
101 See, for example, "perp walks."
10 See Richard E. Myers H, Challenges to Terry for the Twenty-First Century, 81
MIss. L.J. 937, 964 (2012) (discussing prosecutors preparing police officers to testify).
103
See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches
and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) ("As a general rule, payments to witnesses in
return for testimony are considered unethical and illegal. There are, however, two major
exceptions to that general rule: 1) compensation (either immunity from prosecution,
reduced charges, sentence reduction, or cash) by the government to cooperating
witnesses in criminal prosecutions; and 2) fees to expert witnesses in civil and criminal
cases."); see also Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 931 n.44
(1995) (noting a study that shows that juries believe that because defendants are on trial,
they are probably guilty of something); id. at 931 (stating that "[t]he public, with few
exceptions, has enormous faith in the skill and integrity of police and prosecutors").
104 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "BlueWall of Silence"as Evidenceof Bias
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 255-56 (1998).
105 See id.
106 See Ryan Hagglund, Constitutional Protections Against the Harms to
Suspects in Custody Stemming from Perp Walks, 81 MIsS. L.J. 1757, 1767 (2012) ("Perp
walks are a natural outgrowth of the symbiotic relationship between law enforcement
and the media. Accordingly, the police often assist the media's efforts to obtain images
of a suspect in custody." (footnote omitted)).
107 See Roberts, supra note 61, at 1471 (describing the treatment of
preadjudication terminology like "victim" as if it were "neutral").
108 See the "perp walk."
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story that may be met with no story in response.1 09 What prior
conviction impeachment of a prosecution witness can do is attempt
to shake up this united front, this binary of innocence/guilt, of pure
versus immoral character. And in shaking up this united front,
perhaps it has the potential to do something that the rules of
evidence and the use of cross-examination are said to be striving
to do, namely to get us closer to the truth.11O In addition, by
prompting the government to respond-assuming that it takes

an oppositional stance-that the conviction does not necessarily
signal a character flaw and does not necessarily affect credibility,
this intervention may lead to a healthy questioning of the meaning
of the criminal system and its actions on the part of the judge
and jury.
Bringing these conflicting considerations together suggests

that there is no good answer here. This is a flawed tool along many
dimensions. I have suggested elsewhere that it should be abolished
as regards those charged with crimes."' But as regards prosecution
witnesses, both permitting it and abolishing it are problematic.
And while recent scholarship in this area has proposed that we
cut away the worst and keep the least bad,112 it is important to note
the tension. Right at the core of this practice is a reifying of a
conviction as a character brand. No tweaking of the rule
or asymmetrical arrangement gets rid of that. As will be explored
at the end of this Part, the tension is in part the point.
The system cannot serve the needs, goals, or people that it purports
to serve.

B.

What Is the Defense Role?

One can read Judge Weinstein's opinion not just for
its relevance to the scholarly community, but also
for its implications for the defense role. In his order prohibiting
defense counsel's impeachment, and reciting the many
problems with prior conviction impeachment, one can read
Judge Weinstein as saying to defense counsel: you fight every
day against what you are asking for here. We can read him as
alluding to the bind in which defense counsel find themselves109 See, e.g., Ronald J. Bretz, Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case
for a Cautious Approach, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 506, 510 (1987) ("[M]any defendants simply

cannot afford to hire their own expert witnesses .... ); see also Roberts, supra note 69,
at 835-37 (describing one form of deterrent to the testimony of those charged with
crimes, namely the fear of prior conviction impeachment).
110 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); see also FED. R. EVID. 102.
111 Roberts, supranote 1, at 2036.
112 See, e.g., Tilly, supra note 4, at 1620 (proposing a revised Rule 609 for North
Carolina, which would permit only criminafalsi convictions, subject to Rule 403).
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forced,113 perhaps, to argue that convictions hold meaning that in
their own practice they may have seen is illusory.
As Judge Weinstein's opinion suggests, defense attorneysperhaps particularly those like the defense attorney in that
case who represent clients with no assets114-find themselves in a
curious

posture when

they contemplate

engaging

in prior

conviction impeachment. They are keenly aware of the
of
stereotypes,
to
clients
their
of
vulnerability
the distortions and disparities (factual and racial) contained
within and produced by "criminal records," of the use of
these distorted records to pass judgment on who their clients are,
of the humiliation and trauma inflicted by the criminal system,115
and of the vulnerability of their clients to impeachment of
way
the
of
be
aware
may
They
sorts.116
all
in which evidentiary rules function to protect the racial
and economic inequity of the status quo.11 7 They may have
seen the harm done to their clients by questionable "science."118
And yet up they step-up they must step, in the
views of many11 9-to fling at the witness,120 perhaps a traumatized
113
One can compare Jamelia Morgan's description of the dilemma facing
lawyers representing people with disabilities. See Jamelia N. Morgan, Reflections on
Representing Incarcerated People with Disabilities: Ableism in Prison Reform Litigation,
96 DENV. L. REV. 973, 985-86 (2019) ("In cases challenging the treatment of people with
disabilities . . . lawyers representing people with disabilities are forced to represent their
clients as physically, mentally, and emotionally damaged.").
114
See United States v. Walker, 314 F. Supp. 3d 400, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
("Walker is sentenced to 10 years' incarceration for Count Three, to run consecutive to a
concurrent sentence of time served, approximately 34 months, for Counts One and Four.
He is sentenced to five years' supervised release. No fine is imposed since he has, and
will have, no assets. A $300 special assessment is payable forthwith.").
116 See David Luban, The Inevitabilityof Conscience:A Response to My Critics,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1458 (2008) (mentioning the potential of a "brutal crossexamination" to "profoundly humiliate the victim"); see also Abbe Smith, Defending
Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 951 (2000) ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to zealously
represent the criminally accused and simultaneously tend to the feelings of others.").
116 See Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 565 (Pa. 2009) (saying of a
government witness that his "credibility was already assaulted to the nth degree-he
was depicted as a crook, a recidivist, a drug abuser, a drunkard, and an admitted liar").
117
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CriticalRace Theory of Evidence, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2244 (2017) (using Critical Race Theory to describe "how the law
of evidence can insidiously operate to perpetuate racial subordination").
us See Maneka Sinha, Radically Reimagining Forensic Science, 73 ALA. L. REV.
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
(manuscript at 5-6),
(forthcoming 2022)
abstract_id=3891788 [https://perma.cJED77-F2DM].
119 See State v. Balthrop, 457 A.2d 1152, 1155 (N.J. 1983) (indicating that to
represent one's client well, one must argue that, for example, a drug conviction is
relevant to the complainant's testimony).
120 Sometimes literally. State v. Holmes, 464 S.E.2d 334, 338 (S.C. 1995) ("[D]uring
cross-examination, defense counsel threw a document on the floor in front of Burton and the
jury and asked Burton if that was his 'rap sheet,' and if he had a record. Burton responded,
'Yes, sir, I do.").
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victim of crime,121 more trauma,1 22 more distortions; up they step
to frame a criminal record as behavior that reveals who this
person is, and that they are not the kind of person who can be
trusted;123 and indeed perhaps that they have engaged in acts
"of baseness, vileness, or depravity."124 They may need to argue
that, even if years have gone by, the dishonesty remains.
Thus, they may need to reinforce the stereotypes that daily affect
their clients.125
It is a curious posture, but not an unprecedented one. 126
Take, for example, defense attorneys who conclude that in order
to maximize their clients' chances they need to exercise racebased or gender-based peremptory challenges.127 Yes, that may
mean the endorsement of stereotypes, including race-based
ones, against which their work so often tries to push, but it may
be the best chance to tackle the anticipated or actual bias of

121 Note that Almontaser, mentioned above, see supra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text, was alleged to have narrowly avoided a bullet. See United States v.
Walker, 314 F. Supp. 3d 400, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
122 See Tilly, supra note 4, at 1558 (mentioning that prior conviction
impeachment enables "the revictimization of victim-witnesses"); id. at 1610 ("Being
castigated as a liar with her prior criminal record is one more trauma needlessly imposed
on the survivor by the justice system."); see also United States v. Walker, No. 07-CR-347,
2008 WL 3049897, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (Judge Weinstein describing Mr.
Walker, whose case is highlighted in this piece, as "an intelligent man who had a difficult
childhood marked by an emotional disturbance, separation from his immediate family
and his mother's substance abuse problems.").
123 See Appellant's Reply Brief at 10, State v. Doyle, 160 P.3d 516 (Mont. 2007)
(No. 05-362) (defense attorney arguing that a conviction is "reliable evidence on the issue
of dishonesty and credibility").
124 State v. Perry, 364 S.E.2d 201, 202 (S.C. 1988) ("A prior conviction may be
used to impeach a witness's credibility [in South Carolina] only if the conviction involves
a crime of moral turpitude . . . . A crime involving moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man
or to society in general, contrary to the customary and accepted rule of right and duty
between man and man.").
126 See Griffin, supra note 32, at 30-31 (noting that FRE 609 "codifies a
stereotype about felons"). And note that, although precluded from using store clerk
Almontaser's convictions to strengthen his arguments, Mr. Walker was still permitted
to argue (and did argue) that Almontaser was "a lying drug dealer." United States v.
Walker, 974 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 2020).
126 See Futrell, supra note 11, at 177 ("Defenders often play to the perceived biases
of judges, prosecutors, and jurors by promoting harmful narratives about race, culture,
gender, sexual orientation, or ability if it presents the clearest path to a positive legal outcome
for their client.").
127 See, e.g., Abbe Smith, "Nice Work if You Can Get It": "Ethical"Jury Selection
in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 565 (1998) ("No matter how personally
distasteful or morally unsettling, zealous advocacy demands that criminal defense
lawyers use whatever they can, including stereotypes, to defend their clients." (footnote
omitted)); see also Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensibleand Identity Conflicts in
Legal Representation, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 143, 169 (2004) ("[W]omen
defenders who have written about the repugnancy of exploiting sexual stereotypes to
discredit the rape complainant generally remain committed to the libertarian notion that
sometimes the defender's role requires this action.").

&
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criminal decision-makers.128 Or take defense attorneys who
conclude that they need to invoke a "gay panic" defense,129 even if
they view their work as centrally focused on fighting stereotyping
and marginalization. Or those who attack prosecution witnesses as
"snitches,"130 even if they have seen in representing their clients the
fearsome pressures that can bring about cooperation.131 One can
also compare Innocence Project attorneys, many of whom espouse
not just a "[fight] wrongful convictions" stance but also a
"transform the system" stance,8 2 who may denounce a conviction as
the product of "snitch" testimony,133 or who may argue that part of
what was so heinous about governmental misconduct is that "the
real perpetrator" was still out there for years. 134 While these
attorneys are driven by the need to help their clients, what results
is language that dehumanizes, that fuels fears that those who
may have committed crimes remain an alarming threat because
of their persistent criminality, and that appears to endorse the
widespread assumption that for every criminal charge there is a
crime and a criminal wrongdoer.13 The more you speak the
familiar language, and the more you adopt the familiar
categories, perhaps the more persuasive you are in getting your

128 See Roberts, supranote 87, at 1527-28 ("Before a criminal defendant reaches the
moment of being able to exercise peremptory challenges against potential jurors, he or she will
already have been subject to decision making by a host of criminal justice players: legislators,
police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Others, such as probation officers and
parole boards, may lie ahead. Each of these has been shown to be vulnerable to implicit bias, a
phenomenon that is a particular threat to the criminal defendant population, given the
disproportionate representation of people of color therein. Despite the implicit bias affecting
these groups of decision makers, the criminal defendant is-with rare exceptions-stuck with
them: no matter how extreme their bias may be, nothing like a peremptory challenge is
permitted. The peremptory challenge process represents one small area in which an effort to
right the balance can be made." (footnotes omitted)).
129 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay PanicDefense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471,471 (2008).
1S0 For powerful scholarship about "snitches" by someone with a keen interest
in defendants' rights, see generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL
INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2011).
131 But see Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1195-96 (2005) (mentioning defense attorney who "would no sooner
represent a snitch than he would represent 'Nazis or an Argentine general said to be
responsible for 10,000 "disappearances"").
132 About, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/P49J-ZBW5] ("The Innocence Project's mission is to free the staggering number of
innocent people who remain incarcerated, and to bring reform to the system responsible
for their unjust imprisonment.").
133
Contributing Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, httpsJ/
(including
[https-/perma.cc/EL8L-KRQ3]
innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction.
"Informants / Snitches" in a bar chart of "contributing causes of wrongful convictions").
134 See Thomas McGowan, Freeing the Innocent and Identifying True
Perpetrators, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 1, 2008), https://innocenceproject.org/freeingthe-innocent-and-identifying-true-perpetrators/ [https://perma.cc/JB2L-K9V9].
135
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 1449, 1453-54.
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client into the least bad one, but the more you grind these
categories into law and life.
One might respond that this is just what lawyers do. We
make our best arguments for the client at hand, knowing that
we might have to push a contrary position five minutes later. A
few considerations add interesting complexities. First, recent
scholarship has raised the potential relevance of defense
counsel's duties to their other clients, present and perhaps
future.136 Might it be argued that there is no clear ethical
mandate to leverage stereotypes and assumptions in this case if
they contribute to a climate that will negatively affect other
clients? One can ask related strategic questions about the very
case at hand: does your act of humiliating, stigmatizing,
traumatizing, essentializing a person down to their record, and
attributing damning meaning to a conviction, strengthen the
risk that the judge will feel emboldened to do just that to your
client when it comes to selecting a sentence, 137 and potentially
imposing other consequences of conviction?138

The picture is also potentially complicated by the fact
that defense attorneys are currently less likely to be seen as the
kinds of single-minded zealous advocacy machines conjured up
by scholars like Abbe Smith, who champions the position that
defense attorneys need to do what they need to do for their
clients, even if it involves making use of stereotypes, and even if
it may conflict with values that they hold.139 An increasing number
of public defender agencies-and the attorneys within them-are
136
See Rayza B. Goldsmith, Is It Possible to Be an Ethical PublicDefender, 44 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 13, 38 n.118 (2019) ("[T]he rules governing conflicts of interest would
caution against playing on stereotypes if those same characterizations could hurt future clients."
(citing MODEL R. 1.7(a) ("defining conflict of interest as representation of one client that 'will be
directly adverse to another client"'))). But see Fourth Edition of CriminalJustice Standardsfor
the Defense Function, AM. BAR ASS'N (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_
(4-1.7
[httpsJ/perma.cc/R8KV-426R]
justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/
Conflicts of Interest; "(b) Defense counsel should not permit their professional judgment or
obligations regarding the representation of a client to be adversely affected by loyalties or
obligations to other, former, or potential clients .... ').
137
See Morgan, supra note 113, at 987 ("[W]here the pathology of disability is
reinforced, even a legal victory could entail settlement measures with heightened security
restrictions in, albeit, less isolating conditions, or continued segregation, although with more
time out of cell.").
138 See Smith, supra note 115, at 955 ("While I do not regard the use of stereotypes
in criminal defense as an ethical matter, it is a serious tactical matter.").
139 See, e.g., id. at 953 ("There are certainly times when criminal defense lawyers
feel bad about what they must do on behalf of clients, but the lawyer's conscience is
generally not a helpful strategic guide.. .. I do not enjoy stirring up or manipulating
homophobia or race, gender, or ethnic prejudice in the course of representing a client.
However, my own ideological values cannot be the determining factor."); Abbe Smith,
Burdening the Least of Us: 'Race-Conscious"Ethics in CriminalDefense, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1585, 1595-96 (1999) ("Lawyers should not set limits on what they will do to achieve a
client's interests because they conflict with the lawyer's values.").
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claiming a role in the legal system, and the public arena, that
explicitly pursues longer-term, bigger-scale change.140 This change
may be directed at some of the concerns implicated here, such as
relying on junk science, or reifying convictions as acts that reveal
norm-flouting, immoral, or dishonest character, or the doubling
and redoubling of racial disparities, or the silencing of those who
may have stories to tell of, for example, racist police conduct, or the
lasting and pervasive branding and impact of criminal records.
There seems to be a conflict here between what Smith rightly
points out is a requirement of passionate dedication to do what it
takes and this growing determination not to reinforce, but to shift,
the attitudes that are so detrimental to those at risk of, or living
through, criminal system involvement. The powerful long-term
potential of those with experience of defense practice helping to
push toward change seems inevitably to be hampered by the shortterm demands to do whatever it takes to resist the devastating
weight of a criminal conviction.141 Those oppressed by stereotypes
may have to reinforce them. Those oppressed by the system may
act as if deputized by the system's oppressive mechanisms. We can
see an example in an Eighth Circuit case, United States v.
Ferguson, in which Mr. Ferguson argued that the relevant
expungement statute violated his confrontation rights, because it
protects witnesses from the lasting reminder of their conviction.142
An expungement statute that would now serve him well.
This topic therefore merits attention as an example of some
of the challenges facing defense attorneys, and defender
organizations, as they champion roles that go beyond individual
representation and embrace reform of the system, or abolitionist
approaches. How does one square the short-term with the longterm: 4 3 the need to exploit the available tools even while
pushing against purposes that they serve and messages that

140 See Futrell, supra note 11, at 161 (mentioning "the debate that has emerged
in criminal defense literature about the potential conflict between cause lawyering and
loyalty to the individual client").
141 See Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245,
2251 (2014) ("Because of their access to criminal defendants and their ethical mandate to
represent their clients' expressed interests, defense attorneys are uniquely positioned to be an
incredibly powerful weapon in the fight against invidious race bias in the criminal justice
system."). See generally Kate Levine, Police Prosecutionsand PunitiveInstincts, 98 WASH. U. L.
REV. 997 (2021) (discussing apparent carve-outs from abolitionist/anticarceral agendas, on the
part of individuals and organizations).
142
United States v. Ferguson, 776 F.2d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1985).
143
In a different context, see Morgan, supra note 113, at 986, stating that
"although these practical concerns appear paramount in the immediate, or short-term,
perspective of an attorney-client relationship or legal strategy, in the long-term, this
mode of representation and rhetoric may harm the long-term interests of clients with
disabilities, legal or otherwise."
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they send?144 Recent scholarship highlights this type of shortterm/long-term tension as a mechanism impeding the kind of
reformist or even abolitionist visions that are gaining
mainstream attention. Kate Levine, for example, writes of
individuals and institutions whose long-term vision is of a
radical reduction or even doing away with the system, but who
in the short-term call for prosecution, and imprisonment, of at
least certain categories of people.15 The system functions to
defang its critics, and impede their long-term goals, through the
short-term promise that it seems to hold of vindicating the most
vulnerable.146 Is the longer-term vision achievable if always
being countered by the short-term or the carve-outs? Can public
defense ever be abolitionist, or even progressive?
Nicole Smith Futrell has analyzed this kind of tension in a
recent article exploring the possibility of abolitionist clinical
teaching,147 and she opens with a student inquiry into the topic at
hand: the rightness, the soundness, the sense one can find in the use
of a conviction to impeach in a way that enforces all the regressive
assumptions discussed above.148 After all, surely any organization or
individual interested in systemic change in the criminal sphere must

tackle the weight and meaning given to convictions. And even if your
impeachment must be done to help your client, you are adding to the
miasma of stereotypes about what criminal convictions meanstereotypes that may shape the thinking of repeat courtroom players
and the jurors passing through, and that may affect this same client
and other clients, both in the courtroom and in their life outside.149
144
See Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens,
30 LoY. LA L. REV. 119, 122 (1996) ("Any lawyer who decides what evidence to offer or what
positions to assert based upon considerations such as, 'Will this advance the goal of racial
equality?' or 'Will this lessen public confidence in the justice system?' is cheating the client.").
145
See Levine, supra note 141, at 1004-06 (discussing demands for
prosecution/prison time for police suspects/defendants, by those who otherwise take
anticarceral or abolitionist positions).
146 See id. at 1002-03.
147
Futrell, supra note 11, at 164.
148 Id. at 161 ("One of the attorneys was discussing how questioning a witness about
their prior convictions can be a powerful way of undermining that witness's credibility. A
student, visibly disturbed by the conversation, raised their hand to comment: 'How in one
moment can we abhor the inherently racist ways that people's criminal histories are
constantly being used against them, and then in the other moment exploit someone's criminal
record in the name of doing justice for our client? Don't we have an obligation not to engage
in the racist practices that the criminal legal system thrives on? Shouldn't our advocacy
refrain from building up the system we supposedly despise?"').
149
Griffin, supra note 43, at 290-91 ("Legal processes not only reflect, but also
create, familiar narratives."); see Morgan, supra note 113, at 987 (in a related context,
stating that "[t]he mode of representation-namely, that which presents disability as a
type of weakness, pathology, or deficiency-reinforces a set of beliefs which normalize
the mistreatment and abuse of people with disabilities both within the legal system and
beyond. These beliefs become normalized and, once normalized, then provide a basis for
justifying this same mistreatment and abuse.").
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Thus, even if one accepts Abbe Smith's basic take on the need
for individual defenders to prioritize lawyering that maximizes their
clients' chances,150 this form of impeachment complicates this stance,
particularly as defenders explore expanded roles. Again, the goal
here is not to find resolution, but to highlight the fundamental
contradictions involved where defense attorneys may impede the
very things desired by their clients and themselves.151 The goal is not
to criticize the hunger of defenders and defense organizations to
avoid complicity in and replication of the systems in which they
work, but rather both to celebrate the vision and to recognize some
of its limitations.
C.

What Might an Abolitionist Perspective Offer?

Sections II.A and II.B tried to highlight the value of
studying this topic because of the tensions that it presents. I
resisted the temptation to search for compromise in either of
the two dimensions on which I focused: the fundamental values
that push toward abolishing this defense counsel practice
versus those that push toward keeping it; and the fundamental
values that compel defense attorneys to do this versus the
broader goals and visions that they may harbor, and the needs
that their clients may have, that may push in another direction.152
These tensions are reflective of the fact that the criminal
system, and those working within it, are called upon to do
incompatible things. The system is called upon to protect the
rights of defendants but also increasingly called upon to afford
"respect and dignity" to complainants.13 Indeed, I have written
about the fact that the common legal designation of
complainants as "victims" seems to embody this tension: the
160 See Futrell, supra note 11, at 178 ("[A] defender's primary responsibility
must always be to prioritize the urgent, life-saving work of helping to mitigate the impact
of the system on a client's life."); see also Daniel Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1949 ("A thoughtful resistance lawyer ... will likely resort to the
conventional ethical commitment to serve her client first.").
161 See Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King
Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 574
(1993) ("[W]hat are the ethical and moral implications of allowing defense counsel to so
cleverly play upon the racial fears they evidently recognized? The answer is not a simple
one. It pits two fundamental values of our society against one another: the need to have
our system of justice do its work free from the shackles of racial, ethnic, or religious
prejudice, versus the rights of those accused of crimes to zealously and creatively
defend themselves.").
152
See Farbman, supranote 150, at 1947 (mentioning that the defense lawyers
to whom he spoke "came [to their work] with critiques of the system they were practicing
in and with aspirations about what that practice might accomplish").
153
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 1478 (discussing the invocation of "respect
and dignity" in constitutional and other "victims' rights" provisions).
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term is frequently read as an appropriate and necessary way of

showing trust, dignity, and respect,154 but given the core legal
definition of the criminal "victim" (someone who has suffered a
crime), its common preadjudication usage blasts through the
concepts of the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's
burden of proof, and the notion that it is our adjudication
processes that determine the existence of things like crimes and
victims.155 Similarly, defense attorneys work in a space where

the goals that many of them share are in tension-to fight to the
utmost for their clients, but also to fight the things that prior
conviction impeachment (and much of the system) embodies:
questionable science, bias, stereotyping, and perpetual
reminders of one's record. In each of the contexts mentioned
above-jury selection, deployment of defenses, deployment of
cross-examination, and jury argumenti6--they may find
themselves required to exploit stereotypes. Stereotyping is thus
not an unfortunate historical or cultural artifact within the
system, but a tool consciously deployed by those who might
want-and whom we might want-to fight it with vigor; such
are the forces that defense attorneys must oppose.
So, by all means let us think about which of the states
has it best-let us debate the Montana model versus that of
Hawai'i and Kansas-and which state might get it better. But
there is no obvious way to do prior conviction impeachment that
is unobjectionable, and no obvious way that taking this tool
away from the defense will not be objectionable, and thus the
nub of the paradox will remain.
Rather than feeling defeated by these irreducible
tensions, one can usefully reflect on abolitionist visions.
Abolition is understood in a variety of ways, but as described in
one recent account, abolitionists "work toward eliminating
prisons and police, and building an alternate and varied set of
political, economic, and social arrangements or institutions to
respond to many of the social ills to which prison and police now
respond."157 A few aspects of this literature indicate its potential
value for those puzzling over how to respond to these tensions. First,
164
See Z.W. v. Foster, 422 P.3d 582, 583 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (complaining witness
suing presiding judge, after he denied her request to preclude reference to her as the "alleged
victim," and arguing that "alleged victim" violates her state constitutional right to be treated
throughout the criminal justice process with "fairness, respect, and dignity").
15
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 1455 (mentioning Black's Law Dictionary
definition of "victim," which requires actual commission of crime, tort, or harm-rather
than an allegation of the same).
156 See supra Part IB.
157 Amna Akbar, Teaching Penal Abolition, LAW & POL. ECON. (July 15, 2019),
https://lpeblog.org/2019/07/15/teaching-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/4SMS-7SN2].
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while sharing with, for example, "victims' rights" proponents an
interest in respect and dignity, abolitionists point out that
honoring these values for all is not something that our criminal
system is equipped to do.158 Second, and related, they point out
that the criminal system traps us into zero-sum thinking and a
zero-sum reality, where efforts to reduce one side's degradation
may help bring about the other's.169 Third, and again related,
abolitionist thinkers explain that those alleged to have
committed crimes and those alleged to have been harmed by
them frequently exist in a world of shared subordination, allied
more closely than are prosecution and complainant.160 Note, for
example, what is happening when defense counsel flings a
criminal record at a complainant: they are in some instances
flinging the mud of state mistreatment. Abolitionists argue that
those to whom we might turn for reformist initiatives may end
up reinforcing the very systems that they would like to see
changed.11 So too in some instances we can see those who
impeach prosecution witnesses as having been deputized by the
state to do its work for it-reinforcing stereotypes about what a
conviction means-even while fighting it.
The way in which courts and litigators often
conceptualize this issue is that if one side is permitted to show
that the other side has this kind of stain on their character, then
that side should be able to reverse the narrative and show that
158
See Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1647 (2019) ("Because of [its] commitment to active amends and accountability,
justice consistent with an abolitionist ethic offers more to survivors of harm" and
"[a]bolitionist justice also better responds to the dignity and humanity of those who have
perpetrated wrongs."); see also I. India Thusi, Feminist Scripts for Punishment,
134 HARV. L. REV. 2449, 2469 (2021).
159 See Tilly, supra note 4, at 1610 (mentioning that prior conviction
impeachment leads to a defendant "who may reap the windfall of revictimizing the
victim-witness" and that this "is a simple reality of the system the state has adopted");
Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1171
(2015) ("[0]n an abolitionist account, justice is not meaningfully achieved by caging,
degrading, or even more humanely confining, the person who assaulted the vulnerable
among us."); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and
Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 531, 546-47
(2013) ("A victim requires a perpetrator, an identity that is constructed in opposition to
the perfect victim.").
160
See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim's Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for
the Defendant, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 135, 143 (1989); Stacy Caplow, What If There Is
No Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors"of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 25 (1998);
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of "The People"in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 253-55 (2019); Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1358
(2005) ("The divergence of prosecutors' and accusers' interests has become plain .... ").
161
See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 158, at 1643 ("[E]fforts to reform criminal
legal processes in order to attempt to realize idealized visions of justice are doomed to
simply further entrench existing injustices if they are not accompanied by more
transformative demands.").
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you ain't so perfect either. But if one conceptualizes the battle
differently, and perhaps more accurately, as one side saying,
"you've been harmed by a racist under-resourced system that left
you with this permanent encumbrance that the law, resting on
junk science and ignoring empirical data and disregarding
racially disparate impact allows me to fling at you," and the
other side saying, "well you've been equally screwed," one can
start to see another example of something that scholars
concerned about the "victims' rights movement" in its current
form have raised: complainant and defendant have been put into
the arena as sparring partners, when in fact as to both the state
may have failed and imposed racialized harms and hampered
their life prospects.16 2

A final point on the abolitionist front relates to the fact
that wariness about abolitionist visions is often tied to concerns
about "victims."163 The irreducible nub within prior conviction

impeachment of potential degradation,14 of humiliation,165 of
stripping one down to one's record that is permitted-indeed
sometimes found to be a necessary part of effective
representation166--might

unsettle

a

potential

assumption

underlying that sort of resistance: that the criminal system
can be one where complainants are able to pass through
the trial process in a way that guarantees them respectful
treatment and affirms their worth,167 at least if they have
qualifying convictions.
CONCLUSION

Commentators have largely neglected the impeachment
of prosecution witnesses. The reasons are understandable:
162
See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 314 F. Supp. 3d 400, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(saying of Mr. Walker, who sought to impeach complainant store clerk Bazel Almontaser,
that "[b]ecause of his mother's drug addiction, he was removed from her home as a young
child and placed in foster care. . . . He was first incarcerated at age 14.").
163 See, e.g., I. India Thusi, Harm, Sex, and Consequences, 2019 UTAH L. REV.
159, 208 (2019).
164 Tilly, supra note 4, at 1560 (stating that North Carolina's rule "deters and
demeans"); id. at 1565 (describing "degrading character attacks").
166 Id. at 1611 ("North Carolina Rule 609 effectively tells victim-witnesses with
criminal pasts they can expect to the humiliated with their criminal record."). Note that
the commission responsible for drafting Montana's rule prohibiting this form of
impeachment observed that the ability to cross-examine witnesses about felony
convictions "can, in many instances, cause severe embarrassment on the part of the
witness." MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 commission's cmt.
166 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grove, 324 A.2d 405, 406-07 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1974) (finding that it was ineffective assistance of counsel not to engage in this form
of impeachment).
167 See Tilly, supra note 4, at 1558 (stating that jurors may view "victimwitnesses" with prior convictions as "lesser human beings unworthy of protection").
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when it comes to the impeachment of criminal defendants, the
stakes are higher, and a consensus on the need for reform is
clearer. Focusing on prosecution witnesses reveals conflicting
values implicated by the choices of both rule drafters and
defense attorneys. Exposing those conflicts is important. First,
because those who seek reform need to navigate them wisely.
And second, because their lack of easy resolution sheds light on
irreconcilable conflicts in the system and the resulting appeal
of abolitionist arguments.

